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Resurrection of Capital Punishment-The
1976 Death Penalty Cases
I. Introduction
Throughout United States history, Americans have debated the de-
sirability of capital punishment. 1 Some reforms in its administration have
been achieved. Many crimes that were once capital offenses are no longer
punishable by death,2 and early statutes making the death penalty manda-
tory upon conviction of a specified offense have been replaced by proce-
dures allowing the judge or jury discretion to determine the sentence
(although in the past few years some states have returned to mandatory
statutes). 3 Attempts to abolish capital punishment through legislation,
however, have met with more failure than success; at the time of the
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia,4 forty states
and the federal government still provided for capital punishment. 5
In addition to being legislatively challenged, capital punishment has
also been attacked in the courts, particularly during the last dozen years.
6
1. The history of capital punishment in the United States has been discussed exten-
sively. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 335-41 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring);
H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 5-30 (rev. ed. 1968); M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 45-51 (1973); Weaver, Death
Penalty a 300-Year Issue in America, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1976, at 7, col. 5; Comment,
Furman v. Georgia: A Postmortem on the Death Penalty, 18 VILL. L. REV. 678,679-90 (1973).
2. H. BEDAU, supra note 1, at 6-10. Prior to the American Revolution, capital offenses
in one colony or another included sodomy, witchcraft, and stealing grapes. Weaver, supra
note 1. Even in the 1960's more than twenty offenses were punishable by death in the United
States. See H. BEDAU, supra at 39-52. In actual practice, however, most of these capital
statutes were seldom enforced; of 3,812 executions in the United States from 1930 to 1962,
3,298 were for murder, 446 were for rape, and only 68 were for other offenses. Id. at 110 11.
In addition, most states eventually divided murder into degrees, making only first-degree
murder punishable by death. Id. at 23-27. Pennsylvania took the lead in these efforts by
abolishing capital punishment for all crimes except first-degree murder in 1794. 1794 Pa. Laws
174.
3. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,339 (1972) (Marshall, J. concurring); McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 199 (1971); H. BEDAU, supra note 1, at 27-28. This development
resulted from the prevalence of jury nullification under mandatory statutes. See id.; Knowl-
ton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1099(1953); Mackey,
The Inutility of Mandatory Capital Punishment: An Historical Note, 54 B.U.L. REV. 32
(1974). See notes 147-56 and accompanying text infra. These discretionary statutes were so
successful that by 1963 not one state still retained a mandatory death penalty for murder. H.
BEDAU, supra at 29.
4. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
5. See id. at 372 (Marshall, J., concurring). After preparation of the table used here by
Justice Marshall, the California Supreme Court invalidated that state's capital punishment
statute. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406
U.S. 958 (1972).
6. The definitive account of this campaign can be found in M. MELTSNER, supra note
I. Justice Goldberg provided the impetus for these efforts in a 1963 dissent in which he
suggested that capital punishment might be vulnerable on constitutional grounds. Rudolph v.
Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., joined by Douglas and Brennan, JJ., dissenting
While these challenges were not always successful, 7 their existence
effected a de facto moratorium on executions; until the recent end of this
moratorium, 8 not one American had been executed since 1967. 9 The
abolitionists climaxed their attack by arguing in Furman that the penalty of
death was inherently "cruel and unusual" under the eighth 0 and four-
teenth1' amendments to the United States Constitution.'
2
In deciding Furman, however, the Supreme Court held only that
capital punishment as then administered was cruel and unusual. 13 While
this holding effectively invalidated nearly every capital punishment statute
then in existence 4 and spared the lives of some 600 persons on death
row, 5 the uncertainty resulting from the absence of a comprehensive
majority opinion 16 placed the future of capital punishment in "an uncertain
from denial of certiorari); see M. MELTSNER, supra at 28-34. See generally Goldberg and
Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773 (1970).
Taking the lead in this campaign was the Legal Defense Fund, an offshoot of the NAACP
created to bring court action in instances of alleged racial discrimination. M. MELTSNER,
supra note 1, at 5. The Fund originally represented black defendants in capital cases in which
discrimination was alleged, id. at 15, but later it decided to institute a full-scale challenge
against capital punishment as such. Id. at 106-07.
7. The challengers' chief setback came in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183
(197 1), in which the Supreme Court rejected arguments that existing methods of imposing the
death penalty violated due process. See notes 171-72 and accompanying text infra. On the
other hand, the abolitionists had earlier achieved two significant successes: Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), in which the Court barred imposition of the death penalty under
jury-selection systems that excluded persons for merely expressing reservations about
imposing the penalty; and United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), in which the Court
overturned the death penalty provisions of the Federal Kidnapping Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)
(1964). See note 196 infra. The challengers also obtained the judicial invalidation of the capital
punishment statutes of California and New Jersey. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493
P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972) ("cruel orunusual punishment"
under state constitution); State v. Funicello, 60 N.J. 60, 286 A.2d 55 (1972) (invalid under
Jackson).
8. This moratorium ended on January 17, 1977, with the execution of Gary Mark
Gilmore, who had been sentenced to death for murder in Utah. N.Y. Times, January 18, 1977,
at 1, col. 4. Gilmore's case attracted nationwide attention because of his insistence that he be
executed as scheduled. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, November 29, 1976, at 26. As of this writing, no
other death sentences have been carried out; two convicted murderers in Texas have been
granted stays by the Supreme Court. White v. Texas, 45 U.S.L.W. 3415 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1976)
(No. A-446); Jurek v. Estelle, 45 U.S.L.W. 3504 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1977) (No. A-569).
9. The last person prior to Gilmore to be executed was Luis Monge, who died in
Colorado's gas chamber on June 2, 1967. M. MELTSNER, supra note 1, at 113-14. This
moratorium was not merely a by-product of the abolitionists' efforts, but was actually one of
their primary goals. Id. at 107.
10. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The evolution of eighth amend-
ment case law has been treated extensively. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
258-69 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 316-28 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 357-79
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 419-28 (Powell, J., dissenting); M. MELTSNER, supra note 1,
at 170-80; Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment?Furman v. Georgia, 1972 SuP. CT. REV.
1,5-10.
11. The eighth amendment was applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment
in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
12. The arguments are summarized at 40 U.S.L.W. 3341-45 (Jan. 25, 1972).
13. 408 U.S. at 239-40 (per curiam). Only Justices Brennan and Marshall were willing to
conclude that the death penalty was cruel and unusual in itself. See note 16 infra.
14. Id. at 417-18 & n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting). Apparently only statutes making death
mandatory for certain narrowly-drawn offenses were unaffected. Id.
15. Id. at 417.
16. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall each wrote a separate
concurring opinion. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist
authored dissenting opinions, each of which (except that of Justice Blackmun) was joined by
the other three dissenters.
limbo" 1 7 and raised doubts about the constitutionality of the capital
punishment statutes subsequently enacted by thirty-four states and the
federal government. 1 8 This uncertainty was primarily the result of the
Court's failure to answer four important questions:
1. Is the death penalty cruel and unusual punishment per se? 19
Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that death was itself a cruel and unusual
punishment. 408 U.S. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring).
While the two Justices used different analytical approaches, each rested his conclusion
primarily on the arguments that capital punishment had become unacceptable to the American
people, id. at 295-300 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 360-69 (Marshall, J., concurring), and
that death no longer retained significant utility as a method of punishment. Id. at 300-05
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 342-59 (Marshall, J., concurring).
By comparison, the three other members of the majority felt it unnecessary to decide
whether death itself was inherently cruel and unusual. Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring);
id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310-11 (White, J., concurring). Justice Douglas,
commenting that the Court was "imprisoned in the McGautha holding," id. at 248, concluded
that the standardless capital sentencing procedures allowed by that case led to racially
discriminatory results, which he found to violate the "idea of equal protection... implicit in
the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments." Id. at 257.
Justice Stewart also focused on the administration of the death penalty, rather than on the
penalty itself. Unlike Douglas, Stewart was primarily disturbed not by whether the penalty
was imposed on "the constitutionally impermissible basis of race," id. at 310 (Stewart, J.,
concurring), but rather by the apparent lack of any rational basis for imposition:
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck
by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of rapes and
murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are
among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death
has in fact been imposed. . . . [T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot
tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this
unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.
!d. at 309-10 (footnotes omitted).
The fifth member of the majority, Justice White, adopted a more utilitarian perspective.
While he expressed concern about the absence of a "meaningful basis for distinguishing the
few cases in which [death] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not," id. at 313,
White attached more significance to the "excessiveness" of the penalty-its failure to fulfill
its purported purposes-when exacted only infrequently: "[Als the statutes before us are
now administered, the penalty is so infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is too
attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice." Id.
Judicial restraint was the leading theme of the four dissenting opinions; indeed, it was the
only theme of Justice Rehnquist's comparatively brief dissent. Id. at 383-84, 404-05 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting); id. at 410-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 431-33, 464-65 (Powell, J.,
dissenting); id. at 466-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated this theme as
follows:
We should not allow our personal preferences as to the wisdom of legislative and
congressional action, or our distaste for such action, to guide our judicial decision
in cases such as these. The temptations to cross that policy line are very great. In
fact, as today's decision reveals, they are almost irresistible.
Id. at 411. Chief Justice Burger sharply criticized the use of the eighth amendment to evaluate
capital sentencing procedures. Id. at 396-403; see notes 128-29 and accompanying text infra.
The dissenters also took issue with the Brennan-Marshall conclusions concerning the
unacceptability, id. at 385-91 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 434-43 (Powell, J., dissenting),
and excessiveness, id. at 391-96 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 451-56 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing), of the death penalty.
17. Id. at 403 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The legal commentary on Furman has been
extensive. See, e.g. Junker, The Death Penalty Cases: A Preliminary Comment, 48 WASH. L.
REV. 95 (1972); Polsby, supra note 1; Wollen, The Death Penalty After Furman, 4 Lov. U.
CHI. L.J. 339 (1973); Furman v. Georgia: A Postmortem on the Death Penalty, supra note 1.
18. The post-Furman statutes are listed in Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2928 n.23
(1976) (plurality opinion). The Illinois statute listed, however, was invalidated by that state's
supreme court. People ex rel. Rice v. Cunningham, 61 I1. 2d 353, 336 N.E.2d 1 (1975). For a
detailed analysis of many of these stautes, see Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of
the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1690 (1974). In April of 1973 Jesse Lee
Coley, a black convicted of raping a white woman in Wayne County, Georgia, became the
first person sentenced to death under one of these new provisions. N.Y. Times, May 10, 1973,
at 18, col. 4.
19. Four Justices concluded that it was not, two concluded that it was, and three
declined to address the issue. See note 16 supra.
2. Does the existence of discretion within the criminal justice
system at points other than sentencing (nonsentencing discretion) make the
administration of capital punishment unconstitutionally arbitrary?2"
3. Are statutes that provide standards for the imposition of the death
penalty constitutional? 2
4. Are statutes making the death sentence mandatory 22 upon convic-
tion of certain crimes constitutional?
23
In July of 1976, the Supreme Court finally24 answered these questions
in the cases of Gregg v. Georgia ,25 Proffitt v. Florida ,26 Jurek v. Texas ,27
Woodson v. North Carolina,28 and Roberts v. Louisiana. 29 In these cases,
each of which involved a homicide committed in connection with another
felony, 3" the Court decided that the new capital punishment statutes of
20. Nonsentencing discretion includes the decisions of prosecutors concerning what
offense to charge and whether or not to plea-bargain, as well as those of governors or pardons
boards to grant or deny executive clemency. See Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2937 & n.50
(1976) (plurality opinion); id. at 2949 (White, J., concurring); Roberts v. Louisiana, 96 S. Ct.
3001, 3013-14 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); see generally C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:
THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (1974). Since wanton, freakish, and discrimina-
tory imposition of the death penalty were condemned by Justices Stewart and Douglas, see
note 16 supra, the question arose whether merely eliminating or channeling discretion at the
sentencing stage would suffice to make the results of the process significantly less wanton or
freakish than before, if significant discretion remained before or after sentencing. See, e.g.,
Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, supra note 18 at
1712-19; but see, e.g., Comment, Capital Punishment After Furman, 64 J. CRIM. L.C. &
CRIMINOLOGY 281, 284-85 (1973).
21. Some commentators doubted that simply providing standards to guide the sentenc-
ing authority would sufficiently reduce the arbitrariness of capital sentencing procedures.
See, e.g., Note, You May Kill, But You Must Promise Not to Use Discretion, 6 Loy. L.A.L.
REV. 526 (1973); Comment, The Death Penalty: A Cruel and UnusualPunishment, 27 Sw. L.J.
298 (1973); but see Wollen, supra note 17.
22. This comment restricts the use of the term "mandatory" to those capital punish-
ment statutes that require the death penalty upon conviction of specified offenses and provide
no opportunity for the consideration of mitigating circumstances. Thus it excludes from this
definition those statutes allowing some consideration of mitigating circumstances, even
though they may "mandate" the death penalty if such circumstances are not found. See note
132 infra.
23. While mandatory statutes superficially appeared to remedy the problems of arbi-
trariness identified in Furman, some suggested that even these provisions might be uncon-
stitutional. See, e.g., Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes,
supra note 18; The Death Penalty: A Cruel and Unusual Punishment, supra note 21; but see
Wollen, supra note 17.
24. On October 29, 1974, the Court had agreed to hear an appeal by Jesse Fowler, who
had been convicted of murder in North Carolina. Fowler v. North Carolina, 419 U.S. 963
(1974). Fowler had been sentenced to death under the Supreme Court of North Carolina's
decision in State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 194 S.E.2d 19 (1973), which had interpreted
Furman as eliminating the power of that state's juries to recommend mercy in capital cases,
rather than as invalidating the entire death penalty statute. See also State v. Dickerson, -
Del. -, 298 A.2d 761 (1972). After hearing arguments on the Fowler case, the Supreme Court
rescheduled the case for further argument. 422 U.S. 1039 (1975). Fowler's death sentence was
vacated, 96 S. Ct. 3212 (1976), after the Court struck down North Carolina's capital
punishment procedures in Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978 (1976).
25. 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976).
26. 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976).
27. 96 S. Ct. 2950 (1976).
28. 96 S. Ct. 2978 (1976).
29. 96 S. Ct. 3001 (1976).
30. Troy Gregg was convicted of the armed robbery and murder of two men with whom
he and a companionhad hitched a ride. The Supreme Court of Georgia, Gregg v. State, 233
Ga. 117, 210 S.E.2d 659 (1974), affirmed the convictions and death sentences on the two
murder counts but vacated the death sentences for armed robbery. See 96 S. Ct. at 2943-47
(White, J., concurring).
Charles William Proffitt was convicted of murder in a stabbing occurring while he was in
the process of burglarizing the decedent's home. 96 S. Ct. at 2963-64 (plurality opinion). The
Georgia, Florida and Texas, which provided the sentencer with standards
to guide its death penalty decision, satisfied constitutional requirements,
but that those of North Carolina and Louisiana, which mandated the death
penalty upon conviction of certain crimes, did not. 31 This comment
analyzes these five decisions to determine how they answered the questions
left open by Furman and to examine the eighth amendment rationale used
by the Court. It then applies this analysis to evaluate the constitutionality of
Pennsylvania's post-Furman capital punishment statute.32
II. The 1976 Decisions-Gregg, Proffitt, Jurek, Woodson, and Roberts
Collectively, these five cases answered the questions left open by
Furman by holding that (1) death is not necessarily cruel and unusual
punishment, (2) capital punishment statutes may be constitutional despite
the presence of residual nonsentencing discretion, (3) states may satisfy the
requirements of Furman by enacting statutes that guide the sentencer's
exercise of discretion, and (4) states may not constitutionally mandate the
death penalty for a broad category of offenses. The key votes belonged to
Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, the only members of the Court to
side with the majority in each case.33 For this reason, the primary emphasis
conviction and sentence were both sustained by the Supreme Court of Florida. Proffitt v.
State, 315 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1975).
Jerry Lane Jurek was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in the strangulation
and drowning of a ten-year-old girl whom he had kidnapped and (according to one statement)
attempted to rape. 96 S. Ct. at 2953-54 (plurality opinion). The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed. Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
Tyrone Woodson and Luby Waxton were convicted of first-degree murder and sen-
tenced to death for their participation in the armed robbery of a convenience food store,
during which Waxton shot and killed a cashier. 96 S. Ct. at 2981-82 (plurality opinion). Both
judgments were upheld by the state supreme court. State v. Woodson, 287 N.C. 578, 215
S.E.2d 607 (1975).
Stanislaus Roberts was convicted and sentenced to death for the robbery of a service
station during which the attendant was killed. 96 S. Ct. at 3003-04 (plurality opinion). The
Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed. State v. Roberts, - La. -, 319 So. 2d 317 (1975).
31. Subsequently the Court also struck down the mandatory capital punishment statute
of Oklahoma and remanded two capital cases from Arkansas for reconsideration. Green v.
Oklahoma, 96 S. Ct. 3216 (1976) (mem.); Collins v. Arkansas, 97 S. Ct. 44 (1976) (mem.); Neal
v. Arkansas, 97 S. Ct. 45 (1976) (mem.). In addition, eight state courts have invalidated
mandatory death sentence provisions in light of the 1976 cases. Rockwell v. Superior Court,
18 Cal. 3d 420, 556 P.2d 1101, 134 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1976); State v. Spence, - Del. -, 367 A.2d
983 (1976); Boyd v. Commonwealth, 20 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2549 (Ky., Feb. 11, 1977);
Blackwell v. State, - Md. -, 365 A.2d 545 (1976); Smith v. State,- Nev. -, 560 P.2d 158
(1977); State v. Rumsey, - S.C. -, 226 S.E.2d 894 (1976); Collins v. State, 20 CRiM. L. REP.
(BNA) 2490 (Tenn., Jan. 24, 1977); Kennedy v. State, 559 P.2d 1014 (Wyo. 1977). By
comparison, courts have upheld the constitutionality of capital punishment provisions in five
other states. State v. Lee, - Ariz. -, 559 P.2d 657 (1976); Jackson v. State, 337 So. 2d 1242
(Miss. 1976) (mandatory statute saved by judicial interpretation); State v. McKenzie, -
Mont. -, 557 P.2d 1023 (1976); State v. Simants, - Neb. -, 250 N.W.2d 881 (1977); State v.
Bayless, 48 Ohio St. 2d 73, 357 N.E.2d 1035 (1976).
32. Death Penalty Act, Act No. 46, 1974 Pa. Laws 213 (codified in scattered sections of
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. 1976-77)). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet
to rule on the constitutionality of this statute. One lower court, however, has found it
unconstitutional. Commonwealth v. Moody, 20 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2259 (Pa. C.P. Phila.,
Oct. 19, 1976).
33. Justices Brennan and Marshall were the only dissenters in Gregg, Proffitt, and
Jurek. Since they continued to maintain that death was inherently cruel and unusual punish-
ment, they joined in the judgments overturning the statutes of North Carolina and Louisiana.
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and White voted to uphold all
five statutes: they thus concurred in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek, 96 S. Ct. at 2958-60; but
dissented in Woodson and Roberts.
in analyzing these five cases will be upon the plurality opinions co-
authored by these three Justices; material from the concurring and dissent-
ing opinions will be included to clarify or criticize the views of the
plurality.
A. "Cruel and Unusual" Per Se
In these cases the Court unequivocally held for the first time34 that
death is not necessarily a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the
eighth and fourteenth amendments. The plurality based this conclusion on
two grounds: first, capital punishment is not contrary to contemporary
standards of decency; second, capital punishment is not excessively
severe. 
3 5
1. Contemporary Standards of Decency.-The plurality supported
its conclusion that capital punishment did not offend contemporary stand-
ards of decency by referring to the historical acceptance of the death
penalty in the United States,36 the references to it in the Constitution, 37 and
its acceptance in previous Supreme Court cases. 38 It placed most of its
emphasis, however, on the groundswell of support for capital punishment
following Furman. 
39
[D]evelopments during the four years since Furman have under-
cut substantially the assumptions upon which [the 'standards of
decency'] argument rested. Despite the continuing debate, dat-
ing back to the 19th century, over the morality and utility of
capital punishment, it is now evident that a large proportion of
American society continues to regard it as an appropriate and
necessary criminal sanction.'
The plurality supported this assertion by pointing to the reinstitution of
capital punishment by thirty-four states and the federal government since
34. In several earlier cases the Court had implicitly upheld the constitutionality of
capital punishment. The Court held that shooting, Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878), and
electrocution, In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890), were not cruel and unusual methods of
execution. It later decided that a second electrocution attempt after the first had failed would
not be unconstitutional. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
Furthermore, four members of the Court explicitly affirmed the validity of capital punish-
ment in dictum:
Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, both on moral grounds
and in terms, of accomplishing the purposes of punishment-and they are force-
ful-the death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day
when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional
concept of cruelty.
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958) (Warren, C.J., joined by Black, Douglas, and
Whittaker, JJ.). This case is discussed at note 160 infra.
35. Justice White used similar reasoning to reach the same conclusion. Roberts v.
Louisiana, 96 S. Ct. 3001, 3014-17 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
36. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2927-28 (1976). See notes 1-3 and accompanying
text supra.
37. Id. The fifth amendment mentions "capital" crimes, forbids twice putting a person
"in jeopardy of life or limb," and prohibits the deprivation of "life, liberty, or property"
without due process of law. The "life, liberty, or property" phrase is repeated in the
fourteenth amendment.
38. Id. See note 34 supra.
39. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
40. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2928 (1976).
Furman4 and to the willingness of juries to impose death sentences under
these new statutes.
42
This post-Furman reaffirmation of public support for capital punish-
ment made it difficult for Justices Brennan and Marshall to reiterate
convincingly the argument, which they had previously raised in Furman,43
that American standards of decency had evolved to such a point that death
was no longer a tolerable punishment. Justice Brennan ignored the issue in
his brief dissent; 44 Justice Marshall touched on the subject only lightly,
arguing that the issue "turns . . . on the opinion of an informed citizen-
ry." 45 Unless one accepts this viewpoint, there is little doubt, given the
developments since Furman, that capital punishment is still accepted by
contemporary society.
2. Excessive Severity.-This finding alone, however, did not en-
sure that capital punishment was not cruel and unusual per se; it was also
necessary to determine whether the death penalty was excessively severe.
Even if a punishment is accepted by society, "the sanction imposed cannot
be so totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous
infliction of suffering."I In these 1976 cases the Justices debated the
validity of retribution and deterrence as justification for the death penalty
47
as they had done in Furman,48 but few if any new ideas were advanced.
(a) Retribution .- The plurality argued that retribution "is essential in an
ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather than
self-help to vindicate their wrongs," 49 and concluded that "the decision
that capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is
an expression of the community's belief that certain crimes are themselves
so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be
the penalty of death." ' 50 This conclusion was disputed, as it was in
41. Id. The plurality referred to reinstitution by thirty-five states, apparently including
the Illinois statute which was later invalidated. People ex rel. Rice v. Cunningham, 61 I11. 2d
353, 336 N.E.2d 1 (1975).
42. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2929 (1976).
43. 408 U.S. at 295-300 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 360-69 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
44. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2971 (1976).
45. Id. at 2973 (emphasis in original). The drawbacks of this approach, which Justice
Marshall first enunciated in Furman, 408 U.S. at 361-62, were noted by one of the dissenters
in that case: "Rather than merely registering the objective indicators on a judicial balance, we
are asked ultimately to rest a far-reaching constitutional determination on a prediction
regarding the subjective judgments of the mass of our people under hypothetical assumptions
that may or may not be realistic." Id. at 444 (Powell, J., dissenting). This test also invites the
person applying it to make his own personal views the criteria for determining whether or not
the citizenry is "informed"; in Furman, Justice Marshall imputed to his hypothetical
"informed citizenry" his own personal conclusion that "the death penalty is no more
effective a deterrent than life imprisonment." Id. at 362. Thus a Justice's subjective views
can be miraculously transformed into an "objective" standard.
46. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2929-30 (1976).
47. In Furman, Justice Marshall listed four other possible justifications: "Prevention
of repetitive criminal acts, encouragement of guilty pleas and confessions, eugenics, and
economy." 408 U.S. at 342.
48. Id. at 300-05 (Brennan. J., concurring); id. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at
342-54 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 394-96 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 452-56
(Powell, J., dissenting).
49. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2930 (1976).
50. Id.
Furman,5' by Justice Marshall, who asserted that "the taking of life
'because the wrong-doer deserves it' surely must fall, for such a punish-
ment has as its very basis the total denial of the wrong-doer's dignity and
worth. "52
(b) Deterrence.-After reaching this philosophical standoff concerning
retribution, the Justices turned their attention to the equally difficult subject
of deterrence. The plurality, after dismissing statistical studies of the
matter as inconclusive, 53 made an intuitive argument supporting the
deterrent value of the penalty:
[F]or many [murderers], the death penalty undoubtedly is a
significant deterrent. There are carefully contemplated murders,
such as murder for hire, where the possible penalty of death may
well enter into the cold calculus that precedes the decision to act.
And there are some categories of murder, such as murder by a
life prisoner, where other sanctions may not be adequate.
54
Finally, the plurality invoked the principle of judicial restraint, suggesting
that "the resolution of [such a complex factual issue] properly rests with
the legislatures. "55
In contrast, Justice Marshall emphasized the absence of reliable
studies supporting the deterrence justification.5 6 He thus devoted a signifi-
cant portion of his dissent to a highly critical analysis of a recent study
suggesting that the death penalty did indeed serve as a deterrent. 57 After
finding this study to be "of little, if any, assistance," 58 Marshall simply
reiterated what he had said in Furman: "[C]apital punishment is not
necessary as a deterrent to crime in our society."
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Given the inconclusiveness of deterrence studies, 60 allocating the
burden of proof becomes critical. Placing the burden upon the legislatures
to prove the deterrent value of capital punishment, as does Justice Mar-
shall, 61 has disadvantages. The extension of this principle to noncapital
cases would confront legislatures with the Herculean task of proving that
"life imprisonment is a more effective deterrent than 20 years' imprison-
ment, or even that a $10 parking ticket is a more effective deterrent than a
$5 parking ticket." ' 62 On the other hand, a refusal to make such an
extension might be difficult to justify in constitutional terms. Furthermore,
it is difficult to accept the sweeping generalization that death can never
51. 408 U.S. at 342-45.
52. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2977 (1976).
53. Id. at 2930-31.
54. Id. at 2931.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2974.
57. Id. at 2974-75. See Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Ques-
tion of Life and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 397 (1975).
58. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2975 (1976).
59. Id., quoting 408 U.S. at 353.
60. See Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2930-31 (1976) (plurality opinion); C. BLACK,
supra note 20, at 25-26.
61. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 353 (1972).
62. Id. at 396 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
serve as a superior deterrent, although, as the plurality agrees, 63 the
contention that the death penalty always achieves this result may be
equally inaccurate. Thus it is preferable to place the burden of disproving
the deterrent value of the penalty upon the person challenging the penalty,
as did the plurality.64 This conclusion, along with the strong evidence that
the American public favors retention of capital punishment,65 makes it
difficult to accept the contention that death is necessarily a cruel and
unusual punishment.
B. Nonsentencing Discretion
Following this rejection of the argument that capital punishment was
cruel and unusual per se, the plurality also rejected the contention that
capital punishment was still being imposed in a "wanton and freakish" 6 6
manner because of the continued existence of pre- and post-sentencing
discretion.6 7 While stressing the impossibility of "repair[ing] the alleged
defects pointed to by the petitioner," 68 the plurality never determined
whether such defects actually existed. Instead, it simply declined to
consider whether the "wanton and freakish" results condemned in Fur-
man could also arise from the presence of such nonsentencing discretion.
69
By comparison, Justice White's treatment of the issue7a was
straightforward: he simply challenged the petitioners to prove their case.71
Even given the existence of nonsentencing discretion, according to White,
there is "no basis for inferring that capital crimes will be prosecuted so
arbitrarily and frequently [sic] that the present death penalty statute is
invalid under Furman v. Georgia."72 White further buttressed his argu-
ment by pointing to the practical need for discretion at certain points in the
process 73 and by expressing faith that those exercising such discretion
would do so in a reasonable manner.74 His position is persuasive by
63. "We may . . . assume safely that there are murderers, such as those who act in
passion, for whom the threat of death has little or no deterrent effect." Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.
Ct. 2909, 2931 (1976).
64. Id. Accord, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 395 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting),
65. According to a 1976 Gallup Poll, 65% of the American public favored the death
penalty for convicted murderers. N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1976, at 40, col. 8.
66. Compare Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
67. See note 20 supra.
68. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2937 n.50 (1976). This footnote, which is actually
longer than the plurality's brief textual treatment of this issue, suggests that the plurality,
having declined to hold capital punishment unconstitutional directly, was in no mood to
accomplish the same result indirectly by accepting the petitioner's argument on this point:
"The petitioner's argument is nothing more than a veiled contention that Furman indirectly
outlawed capital punishment by placing totally unrealistic conditions on its use." Id. A
process so rigid as to eliminate such nonsentencing discretion would be, according to the
plurality, "totally alien to our notions of criminal justice," as well as being unconstitutional;
"Such a system in many respects would have the vices of ... mandatory death penalty
statutes . . . ." Id.
69. Id. at 2937.
70. Id. at 2949; Roberts v. Louisiana, 96 S. Ct. 3001, 3013-14 (1976).
71. See Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2949 (1976).
72. Roberts v. Louisiana, 96 S. Ct. 3001, 3014 (1976). "Infrequently" was probably
intended.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 3013-14; Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2949 (1976).
default, since none of the Justices presented the other side of the issue. 75
C. Guided Discretion Statutes
After thus declining to find that capital punishment was invariably
unconstitutional, either because of its inherently cruel and unusual charac-
ter or because of the inability to eliminate nonsentencing discretion, the
court then turned its attention to the individual statutes at issue. In Gregg,
Proffitt, and Jurek, it upheld the constitutionality of capital punishment
provisions that attempted to meet the requirements of Furman by guiding
the sentencing authority in its exercise of discretion. Each of these "guided
discretion" statutes provides for a bifurcated procedure. First the trier of
fact determines guilt or innocence; then, if a guilty verdict is returned, the
sentencing authority imposes death or life imprisonment after hearing
relevant evidence and arguments at a post-trial sentencing hearing. 76 Each
statute also provides for review of capital sentences by the highest state
appellate court.
77
1. Standards in General.-The plurality did not interpret Furman
as requiring that all discretion in the sentencing process be eliminated,
78
but rather as holding that any discretion allowed "must be suitably directed
and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
action. '- 79 In each of these three cases the plurality emphasized that the
procedures involved served to "focus the jury's attention on the par-
ticularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the
individual defendant. 80 In spite of its repeated invocation of phrases such
as "channeled discretion," the plurality was remarkably tolerant in its
evaluation of the standards promulgated by these three states. This be-
comes evident when each state procedure is examined separately.
(a) Florida.-Florida's statute provides more explicit guidance concern-
ing circumstances to be considered by the sentencing authority than do
those of Texas or Georgia. The statute lists eight aggravating 8' and seven
75. Justices Brennan and Marshall probably thought it unnecessary to address this
issue, since they had already decided that the death penalty itself was cruel and unusual. See
notes 34-65 and accompanying text supra. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and
Rehnquist presumably agreed with the conclusion reached by the plurality and Justice White
on this issue, since they concurred in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek.
76. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2503 (Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West Supp.
1977); TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
77. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537 (Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(4) (West Supp.
1977); TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071(f) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
78. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932 (1976).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2941. Compare Proffittv. Florida, 96S. Ct. 2960,2966(1976);Jurek v. Texas,
96 S. Ct. 2950, 2957 (1976).
81. Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an
accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnap-
mitigating82 circumstances; the sentencing authority 3 is directed to deter-
mine whether "sufficient mitigating circumstances exist . . . which
outweigh aggravating circumstances found to exist."'8 4 This procedure
thus not only tells the sentencer what aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances to take into account, but also directs the manner in which these
circumstances are to be considered. Accordingly, the plurality had little
difficulty reaching the conclusion that "this system serves to assure that
sentences of death will not be 'wantonly' or 'freakishly' imposed."
8 5
(b) Texas.-Capital sentencing procedures in Texas are much more
general; once a jury finds a defendant guilty of capital murder,8 6 it
determines the sentence to be imposed by answering the following
questions:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death
of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reason-
ping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a
destructive device or bomb.
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any
governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (West Supp. 1977).
82. Mitigating circumstances shall be the following:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another
person and his participation was relatively minor.
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination
of another person.
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
Id. § 921.141(6).
83. In Florida the trial judge makes the final sentencing decision; the verdict of the jury,
which requires a majority vote, is only advisory. Id. §§ 921.141(2)-(3). There has been
extensive litigation concerning the power of a trial judge, under this system, to impose a death
sentence in cases in which the advisory jury recommends life imprisonment. See, e.g.,
Gardner v. State, 313 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1975); rev'd, Gardner v. Florida, 45 U.S.L.W. 4275
(U.S. March 22, 1977); Tedder v, State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975); Dobbert v. State, 328 So.
2d 433 (Fla. 1976), cert. granted sub nor., Dobbert v. Florida, 97 S. Ct. 352 (1976) (No.
76-5306); Chambers v. State, 339 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1976).
84. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2) (West Supp. 1977).
85. Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960, 2970 (1976).
86. Texas classifies as "capital murder" only those intentional killings committed in
one of five specific situations:
(1) the person murders a peace officer or fireman who is acting in the lawful
discharge of an official duty and who the person knows is a peace officer or
fireman;
(2) the person intentionally commits the murder in the course of committing or
attempting to commit kidnapping, burglary, robbery, aggravated rape, or arson;
(3) the person commits the murder for remuneration or the promise of
remuneration or employs another to commit the murder for remuneration or the
promise of remuneration;
(4) the person commits the murder while escaping or attempting to escape
from a penal institution; or
(5) the person, while incarcerated in a penal institution, murders another who
is employed in the operation of the penal institution.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 19.03(a) (Vernon 1974).
able expectation that death of the deceased or another would
result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continu-
ing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defend-
ant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the
provocation, if any, by the deceased. 87
The trial judge imposes a sentence of death if the jury answers all three
questions in the affirmative; the punishment is life imprisonment if the
answer to any of the questions is negative. 88 While the questions include no
reference to specific mitigating circumstances, 89 they do provide a
framework within which the jury can fit these circumstances. The ability of
such a broadly-phrased inquiry to "channel" jury discretion effectively,
however, is questionable. 90 The plurality nevertheless found that the Texas
system was a satisfactory solution to the problem of "wanton and freak-
ish" imposition of the death penalty. 9 '
(c) Georgia.-The Georgia statute's capital punishment provisions fur-
nish even less guidance. The jury must consider ten aggravating circum-
stances specifically enumerated in the statute, 92 along with other appro-
87. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
One commentator has argued that the first and third of these questions are superfluous.
C. BLACK, supra note 20, at 59-62. Black's argument concerning the first question is
persuasive: it is hard to see how a jury could find in its sentencing deliberations that the
defendant's conduct had not been "committed deliberately and with the reasonable expecta-
tion that death of the deceased or another would result," TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
37.071(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77), after it has already found that the defendant "intention-
ally or knowingly cause[d] the death of an individual." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, §
19.02(a)(1) (Vernon 1974). (While section 19.02(a) also contains two other subsections
defining murder, only those murders which fall within the definition of subsection (I) are
punishable by death. Id. § 19.03(a)).
Black also contends that the third question is redundant because, had the jury found the
defendant's response to the victim's provocation to have been reasonable, the offense would
rise no higher than voluntary manslaughter. C. BLACK, supra at 61-62. This argument,
however, apparently ignores the requirement of "sudden passion" in the Texas definition of
voluntary manslaughter. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 19.04 (Vernon 1974).
88. TEX. CODE CRiM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(e) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
89. Jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 2956 (1976) (plurality opinion).
90. See C. BLACK, supra note 20, at 63.
91. Jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 2958 (1976).
92. These aggravating circumstances are as follows:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was commit-
ted by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense
of murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious
assaultive criminal convictions.
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was commit-
ted while the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony, or
aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was committed while the offender was
engaged in the commission of burglary or arson in the first degree.
(3) The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping knowing-
ly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of
a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than
one person.
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for
the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value.
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or
solicitor or former district attorney or solicitor during or because of the exercise of
his official duty.
priate, but unspecified, aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 93 While
a sentence of death may be imposed only if the jury finds at least one
statutory aggravating circumstance, 94 even upon such a finding the jury
retains the discretion to return a sentence of life imprisonment.95 More
importantly, the statute gives the jury no guidance in exercising this
discretion.9 6 Thus in cases of aggravated homicide, the discretion of
Georgia juries appears to be essentially as great as at the time of Furman.
2. Aggravating Circumstances.-One clue to discerning the plu-
rality's underlying intentions is its emphasis that in each case the sentenc-
ing authority "must find and identify at least one statutory aggravating
factor before it may impose a penalty of death." 97 This requirement is
explicit in the Georgia statute; 98 Texas' limited definition of capital
murder99 "serves much the same purpose."' 10 Moreover, the plurality
made every effort to interpret the ambiguous Florida statute in a similar
fashion. 10'O This emphasis on statutory aggravating circumstances suggests
that the plurality may have been acting on the unarticulated premise that
death is a disproportionate penalty for murders that are not accompanied by
some sort of aggravating circumstance.'
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3. Mitigating Circumstances .- The plurality was not concerned
solely with aggravating circumstances, however: "A jury must be allowed
to consider on the basis of all relevant evidence not only why a death
sentence should be imposed, but also why it should not be imposed."'l
3
While Georgia's statute specifically provides for consideration of mitigat-
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed
murder as an agent or employee of another person.
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity
of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.
(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, correc-
tions employee or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties.
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped
from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement.
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with,
or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself
or another.
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (Supp. 1976).
93. Id. § 27-2534.1.
94. Id. § 27-2534.1(c).
95. Id. §§ 26-3102, 27-2302.
96. See C. BLACK, supra note 20, at 65.
97. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2941 (1976).
98. See note 94 supra.
99. See note 86 supra.
100. Jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 2955 (1976).
101. Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960, 2965 n.8 (1976). The plurality admitted that the
Supreme Court of Florida had upheld one death sentence where the judge had simply listed six
aggravating factors. Id. See Sawyer v. State, 313 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1975). It noted, however,
that "some of these aggravating factors arguably fell within the statutory categories" and
concluded that the Supreme Court of Florida would probably not uphold a death sentence
based entirely on nonstatutory aggravating circumstances, emphasizing the use of the word
"'limited" in the statutory reference to aggravating circumstances. Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S.
Ct. 2960, 2965 n.8 (1976). See note 81 supra.
102. See notes 136-146 and accompanying text infra.
103. Jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 2956 (1976).
ing circumstances, 104 and Florida's statute goes even further by listing
them, 10 5 the Texas statute does not specifically allow such considera-
tion.106 This omission was nearly fatal, since "a system [allowing only
aggravating circumstances to be considered] would approach the manda-
tory laws that we today hold unconstitutional." 07 To uphold the Texas
statute, the plurality was forced to rely on language used by the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals indicating that the defendant could bring
mitigating factors to the jury's attention in relation to their consideration of
the second question specified in the statute. 0 " This requirement that the
sentencing authority must be allowed to consider mitigating as well as
aggravating circumstances is discussed at greater length in connection with
the invalidation of the North Carolina and Louisiana statutes.1
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4. Sentencing Hearing.-In addition to being required to consider
mitigating circumstances, the sentencing authority must also have the
opportunity to receive all evidence relevant to those circumstances. 110 The
plurality noted approvingly that Georgia, Florida and Texas had each
provided for a separate sentencing hearing"' and indicated that such a
system is "more likely to ensure elimination of the constitutional deficien-
cies identified in Furman."" 2 This preference is based on the jury's need
to have information relevant to sentencing that might be prejudicial on the
issue of guilt. 113 While the plurality was quick to disclaim any intention
"to suggest that only the above-described procedures would be permissi-
ble,"114 it is apparent that any state wishing to experiment with a different
system does so at its own risk.
5. Appellate Review.-Finally, the plurality pointed to the addi-
tional assurance of meaningful review by an appellate court with statewide
jurisdiction." 5 It reserved its kindest words for Georgia's requirement that
its state supreme court must decide whether each sentence is excessive in
relation to the penalties imposed in similar cases, "considering both the
crime and the defendant." 116 This "proportionality review," the plurality
concluded, "substantially eliminates the possibility that a person will be
sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury. "117 Furthermore, the
104. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (Supp. 1976).
105. See note 82 supra.
106. Jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 2956 (1976) (plurality opinion).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2956-57. See Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934, 939-40 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
109. See notes 157-165 and accompanying text infra.
110. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932-34 (1976).
111. Id. at 2941; Proffitt v, Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960, 2966 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct.
2950, 2955 (1976).
112. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2934 (1976).
113. Id. at 2933-34.
114. Id. at 2935. The Court used similar language in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
467 (1966): "[W]e cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any
particular solution . . . .Our decision in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which
will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect."
115. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2937, 2939-41 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct.
2960, 2966-67, 2969-70 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 2958 (1976).
116. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(3) (Supp. 1976).
117. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2940 (1976) (plurality opinion).
plurality noted that the Supreme Court of Florida has, in effect, adopted the
same kind of review, although not required to do so by statute.
11 8
Conversely, the court upheld the constitutionality of the Texas statute
without finding that the state's Court of Criminal Appeals engaged in a
similar process, commenting merely that the statute provided "prompt
judicial review of the jury's decision in a court with statewide jurisdic-
tion. " 119 Thus, while the plurality obviously favors the kind of "propor-
tionality review" conducted in Georgia and Florida, simply providing for
review of all death sentences by a court of statewide jurisdiction appears to
be sufficient. 120
D. Mandatory Statutes
The importance of appellate review, a separate sentencing hearing,
and a system for weighing mitigating and aggravating circumstances is
demonstrated by Woodson and Roberts, in which the Court invalidated the
mandatory death penalty statutes of North Carolina and Louisiana. These
statutes provided for no sentencing hearing, enumerated no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, and made no specific provisions for appellate
review of sentences. In each state the death penalty was mandatory upon
conviction of first-degree murder; 2 ' in North Carolina this consisted of
both "willful, deliberate and premeditated" killings and felony mur-
ders, 122 while in Louisiana it was limited to killings in which the offender
had the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and at least one of
five specified circumstances was present. 1
23
1. Contemporary Standards of Decency.-Although the Court had
earlier rejected the contention that capital punishment itself violated
contemporary standards of decency, it decided that these standards were
violated by mandatory capital punishment statutes, thus making such
statutes unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. After reviewing the history
118. Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960, 2966-67 (1976).
119. Jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 2958 (1976) (plurality opinion).
120. Even this is not explicitly required, since the plurality refers to such review only
as an "additional safeguard." Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2937 (1976).
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (West 1974 &
Supp. 1976).
122. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1975).
123. First degree murder is the killing of a human being:
(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm
and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnapping,
aggravated rape, aggravated burglary or armed robbery; or
(2) When the offender has a specific intent to kill, or to inflict great bodily
harm upon, a fireman or a peace officer who was engaged in the performance of his
lawful duties; or
(3) Where the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
harm and has previously been convicted of an unrelated murder or is serving a life
sentence; or
(4) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm
upon more than one person;
(5) When the offender has specific intent to commit murder and has been
offered or has received anything of value for committing the murder.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 14:30 (West 1974 & Supp. 1976).
of mandatory death penalty legislation in the United States, ' 2 4 the plurality
concluded that "the practice of sentencing to death all persons convicted of
a particular offense has been rejected as unduly harsh and unworkably
rigid." '2 5 The plurality failed to make clear, however, whether society has
in its opinion rejected the process of mechanically imposing mandatory
death sentences, rather, of the results of such imposition. Some of the
plurality's language can be read to support either interpretation. For
instance, its reference to "the rejection of the common-law practice of
inexorably imposing a death sentence upon every person convicted of a
specified offense" 2 6 can be construed as condemning either the "inexor-
able" process of automatic imposition or the result that "every" convicted
murderer is to die.
(a) Process.-Much of the plurality's language in both Woodson and
Roberts suggests that it is primarily concerned about society's perceived
rejection of the process of mechanically sentencing persons to death. For
example, the plurality notes "the repudiation of automatic death sen-
tences." 127 The application of "evolving standards of decency" in this
context reveals the plurality's failure to distinguish between a procedure
for imposing punishment and punishment itself. The language of the eighth
amendment refers only to the latter, and prior to Furman no case constru-
ing the amendment had indicated that it could be used to strike down
procedures for imposing a punishment, once the punishment itself was
upheld as constitutional and not disproportionate to the offense.' 28 As
Chief Justice Burger put it, "The [Eighth] Amendment is not concerned
with the process by which a State determines that a particular punishment is
to be imposed in a particular case."'
129
Moreover, the conclusion that society has actually rejected mandatory
capital punishment procedures as intolerable under evolving standards of
decency is open to serious question. The disappearance of such provisions
prior to Furman 13 0 can be best explained not by invoking contemporary
standards of decency but rather by observing that these mandatory proce-
dures had proved unworkable. Society was concerned that many murderers
were not being punished at all because of jury nullification, not that too
many murderers were being executed.' 3 ' "Unworkable" is hardly
synonymous with "cruel and unusual."
124. Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2984-86 (1976).
125. Id. at 2986. The Court left open the possibility that a mandatory death penalty
statute "limited to an extremely narrow category of homicide, such as murder by a prisoner
serving a life sentence, defined in large part in terms of the character or record of the
offender" might be constitutional. Id. at 2983 n.7.
126. Id. at 2990 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 2986 (emphasis added).
128. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 397-400 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 397.
130. See note 3 supra.
131. Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2994-96 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
Finally, the enactment of mandatory death penalty provisions by a
substantial number of states' 32 after Furman undercuts the plurality's
argument that compulsory death sentences "[depart] markedly from con-
temporary standards." 133 The plurality's assertion that this pattern resulted
from an "artificial choice"' 34 between mandatory capital punishment and
no capital punishment at all conveniently ignores the possibility of enacting
some form of guided-discretion statute, as did numerous other states.1
35
Even had this option not been available, the plurality's argument does not
satisfactorily explain why the states did not simply abandon capital
punishment, if mandatory statutes were as discredited as the plurality
claimed.
(b) Result.-Alternatively, the plurality may have been referring to
society's alleged repudiation of the result of mandatory capital punishment
provisions-in other words, the imposition of the death penalty on even the
least culpable of first-degree murderers. This conclusion is suggested by
the plurality's statement that "even in first-degree murder cases juries with
sentencing discretion do not impose the death penalty 'with any great
frequency.' " 36 To the plurality, this indicated that "under contemporary
standards of decency death is viewed as an inappropriate punishment for a
substantial portion of convicted first-degree murderers." 37 This result-
oriented interpretation implies that the plurality may have considered death
to be a disproportionate penalty for first-degree murders that are unaccom-
panied by aggravating circumstances. 38 This view is also supported by the
plurality's emphasis upon the presence of statutory aggravating circum-
stances in the Georgia, Florida and Texas statutes. '39
Although this utilization of contemporary standards of decency to
measure whether a punishment is disproportionate to the offense is well
supported by precedent,' the plurality's application of this test in these
132. Ascertaining the exact number involves difficult questions of classification, since
the line between discretionary and mandatory statutes is not always easy to draw. Justice
White, for example, stressed the mandatory aspects of the Flordia and Texas statutes. Proffitt
v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960, 2970 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 1959(1976). As many as
twenty of the post-Furman statutes have been classified as mandatory by one observer or
another. N.Y. Times, July 4, 1976, § 4, at 3, col. i.
133. Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2990(1976). Compare notes 39-42 and
accompanying text supra.
134. Id. at 2989 n.35.
135. See Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, supra
note 18, at 1699-1710.
136. Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2987 (1976) (plurality opinion).
137. Id.
138. In Gregg, the plurality concluded that "when a life has been taken deliberately by
the offender, we cannot say that the punishment [of death] is invariably disproportionate to
the crime. It is an extreme sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes." 96 S. Ct. at 2932
(footnote omitted, emphasis added).
139. See notes 97-102 and accompanying text supra.
140. In Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), a minor official of the United
States Government of the Philippines had been convicted of falsifying an official document.
For this transgression he was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment in chains at hard and
painful labor, the loss of certain civil rights, and perpetual subjection to government
surveillance. In deciding that this punishment was cruel and unusual, the Supreme Court
two cases is open to serious question. Since the Supreme Court has
traditionally been reluctant to interfere with legislatively prescribed pun-
ishments 141 unless they are grossly disproportionate to the offense,1
42
imposing the death sentence for premeditated murder, even if unaccom-
panied by aggravating circumstances, may not be so out of line as to be
prohibited by the Constitution. Moreover, while the North Carolina statute
mandates the imposition of the death penalty for first-degree murder even
in the absence of specific aggravating circumstances, the fact situation of
Woodson hardly lacked such circumstances. 143 Thus the Court's decision
benefited even the most culpable murderers, for whom death could hardly
be considered a disproportionate punishment, as well as those who may
have been less culpable. 14"
Furthermore, the disproportionality rationale provides little or no
justification for the invalidation of Louisiana's statute, which is limited to
murders accompanied by aggravating circumstances. 145 As Justice White
pointed out,
the only mandatory statutes which were historically repealed or
replaced were those which made death the mandatory punish-
ment for all first-degree murders. . . .The history relied upon
by the majority is utterly silent on society's reaction to [a statute
such as that of Louisiana]. It cannot be invalidated on the basis
of contemporary standards because we do not know that it is
inconsistent with such standards. '
Since the plurality can hardly be saying that death is a disproportionate
penalty for those types of aggravated homicide with which Louisiana is
observed both that "punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense,"
id. at 367, and that the eighth amendment "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." Id. at 378.
In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Court invalidated aCalifornia statute
making it a criminal offense to be addicted to narcotics. Here, rather than focusing on the
severity of the penalty, the Court instead emphasized the nature of the offense: "Even one
day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common
cold." Id. at 667. As in Weems, the Court combined a dynamic interpretation of the eighth
amendment with the doctrine that a particular punishment, although not cruel and unusual in
itself, may be found so when the offense being punished is also taken into account:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would attempt to make it a
criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a
venereal disease . . . . [l1n the light of contemporary human knowledge, a law
which made a criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless be universally
thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. at 666 (emphasis added).
141. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2925-26 (1976) (plurality opinion).
142. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 456-58 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
143. See note 30 supra. Waxton's shooting of the cashier was apparently deliberate
rather than accidental. 96 S. Ct. at 2981. Woodson could be considered less culpable, since he
did not enter the store but merely served as a lookout. Id.
144. This disproportionality theory would provide a better justification for a case-by-
case evaluation of death sentences from mandatory jurisdictions, striking down only those in
which death was disproportionate in relation to the facts of the specific case. Such a
case-by-case process of adjudication was suggested by Justice Powell in Furman. 408 U. S. at
461. See also note 138 supra.
145. See note 123 and accompanying text supra.
146. Roberts v. Louisiana, 96 S. Ct. 3001, 3020 n.8 (1976).
concerned, it is hard to see how "evolving standards of decency" can
justify that statute's invalidation.
2. Jury Nullification .- As the above discussion illustrates, whether
the plurality was referring to the result of or the process utilized in
mandatory death sentence statutes, its argument that such statutes violated
contemporary standards of decency can be met by persuasive counter-
arguments. But the plurality did not base its decision on this ground alone;
two additional arguments were advanced. The first of these arguments,
dealing with the effect of potential jury nullification, began with the
premise that jurors who feel a particular defendant charged with first-
degree murder does not deserve to die will refuse to convict even though
the evidence of guilt is conclusive. 147 This de facto sentencing discretion is
not guided by any prescribed standards and may result in the death penalty
being administered as "wantonly" and "freakishly" as it was before
Furman. 14 8 In particular, whether a given defendant is to live or die will
depend largely on the willingness of his jury to disregard its instructions. 49
Once this initial premise is accepted, the plurality's argument is a
strong one, at least as it applies to North Carolina's statute. Although the
Court apparently had no information concerning the extent of jury nullifi-
cation under the two provisions at issue, 50 the plurality argued persuasive-
ly that, given the historical record, 151 the burden should be on those who
contended that this past pattern of nullification would not recur. 52
The combination of this nullification argument and the disproportion-
ality argument creates a dilemma for the supporters of the North Carolina
statute, although the plurality did not articulate it. If the existence of a
significant amount of jury nullification is admitted, the statute could fairly
be said to be unconstitutionally arbitrary, since such nullification would be
unguided and unchecked. On the other hand, if it is assumed that little or no
nullification would take place, many of the death sentences imposed would
arguably be disproportionate to the offense committed.' 53 This dilemma
could be avoided only by denying the arbitrariness of the results in the
former situation or the disproportionality of the sentences in the latter.
147. Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2984-86, 2990-91 (1976).
148. Id. at 2991.
149. Id.
150. The only specific information relating to these two statutes offered by the plurality
was a 1949 North Carolina study. Id. at 2989.
151. It was the prevalence of such nullification under early mandatory statutes that led to
the adoption of discretionary provisions, as mentioned at note 3 and accompanying text
supra. Even the dissenters did not dispute that nullification had occurred with some regularity
under these early mandatory systems. Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978,2996 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Roberts v. Louisiana, 96 S. Ct. 3001, 3019 (1976) (White, J.,
dissenting).
152. It is interesting to compare the arguments for the allocation of this burden to those
concerning allocating the burdens of proving the deterrent value of the death penalty, see
notes 60-64 and accompanying text supra, and the possible prejudicial effects of nonsentenc-
ing discretion, see notes 67-69 and accompanying text. supra.
153. See notes 136-146 and accompanying text supra.
Although this nullification argument was convincingly made in
Woodson, its applicability to the Louisiana statute is less clear.' 5 4 The
frequency of jury nullification under early statutes mandating death in all
cases of first-degree murder has little relevance in predicting how much
nullification is likely when death is required only for certain categories of
first-degree murder. Common sense suggests that the likelihood of jury
nullification increases as the relative culpability of the defendant de-
creases. Thus the frequency of jury nullification should be significantly
lower in Louisiana than in North Carolina, since in the former state
murderers whose offenses were unaccompanied by aggravating circum-
stances are not subject to the death penalty.1 55 While occasional isolated
instances of nullification might still occur, these would hardly suffice to
make the system unconstitutionally arbitrary: "Nothing in any of our cases
suggests that the decision to afford an individual defendant mercy violates
the Constitution." 156
3. Individualized Sentencing Determination .- Neither this nullifi-
cation argument nor the contemporary standards of decency argument
satisfactorily explains the invalidation of the Louisiana statute, though they
may have validity when applied to North Carolina's. The plurality's third
argument-that sentencing must be individualized-is its last effort to
justify the invalidation of mandatory capital punishment statutes. The
plurality stated the individualized sentencing argument as follows: "[Iln
capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment. . .requires consideration of the character and record of the
individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense
... II"' Mandatory capital punishment statutes "[exclude] from con-
sideration. . . the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors...
[thus treating] all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely
individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated
mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death." 118 It is
154. The plurality's application of the jury nullification argument to the Louisiana
system rested primarily upon that state's "responsive verdict" procedure. Under this
procedure every jury in a first-degree murder case is automatically instructed on the elements
of second-degree murder and manslaughter, whether or not supported by the evidence or
requested by the defendant, LA. CODE CRIM. PRo. ANN. arts. 809, 814 (West 1967 & Supp.
1976). See Roberts v. Louisiana, 96 S. Ct. 3001, 3006-07 (1976); State v. Cooley, 260 La. 768,
771, 257 So. 2d 400,401-02 (1972). According to the plurality, this procedure "not only lacks
standards to guide the jury in selecting among first-degree murderers, but it plainly invites the
jurors to disregard their oaths and choose a verdict for a lesser offense whenever they feel the
death penalty is inappropriate." 96 S. Ct. at 3007.
As the plurality concedes, however, "Louisiana juries are instructed to return a guilty
verdict for the offense charged if warranted by the evidence and to consider lesser verdicts
only if the evidence does not justify a conviction on the greater offense." Id. at 3007 n. 10.
This concession undermines the plurality's argument that jurors are invited to disregard their
oaths. See id. at 3012-13 (White, J., dissenting).
155. See note 123 and accompanying text supra.
156. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2937 (1976) (plurality opinion).
157. Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991 (1976).
158. Id.
of course indisputable that the North Carolina and Louisiana statutes do not
provide such individual consideration; the real issue is whether the
plurality was justified in its conclusion that the eighth amendment requires
such procedures.
The plurality's only effort to support these requirements in eighth
amendment terms was by referring to "the fundamental respect for
humanity underlying the . . . Amendment.' 159 Even if this notion is
accepted, it must be stressed that never before had the "fundamental
respect for humanity" idea been used independently to erect constitutional
requirements in eighth amendment cases. Instead, the Court had always,
after invoking this concept, gone beyond it to examine whether the
punishment in question violated contemporary standards of decency 160 or
was disproportionate to the offense charged.'61 Without being supported
by one of these two criteria, "fundamental respect for humanity" is so
abstract a concept as to be virtually meaningless. 162 Its invocation serves
only to give constitutional stature to the personal views of a particular
Justice. Justice Brennan's desire to enforce his judgment that "[t]he
calculated killing of a human being by the State involves, by its very
nature, a denial of the executed person's humanity"' 63 can be no more or
less justifiable than the plurality's enforcement of its notions of what
"fundamental respect for humanity" requires." 4 Certainly the eighth
amendment should be interpreted in light of contemporary social values,
but the reference point should be the actual, objectively ascertained values
of the public' 65 rather than the subjective personal views of the Justices.
159. Id. Here once again the plurality scrutinized the procedures for imposing punish-
ment rather than the punishment itself. See notes 127-135 and accompanying text supra.
The plurality also emphasized that "the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a
sentence of imprisonment, however long. " Id. at 2992. It is difficult to see, however, how this
premise leads to the conclusion that an individualized sentencing determination is constitu-
tionally required in capital cases. Id. at 3000 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In all probability, this
emphasis on the proposition that "death is different" was intended not so much to justify
requiring such individual consideration in capital cases, but rather to discourage extension of
this requirement to noncapital cases.
160. The best example of this approach is Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86(1958), in which the
penalty of denationalization for wartime desertion was held cruel and unusual. While Chief
Justice Warren did state that "[tihe basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man." id. at 100 (Warren, C.J., joined by Black, Douglas, and
Whittaker, JJ.), he also elaborated on this generalization: "While the State has the power to
punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of
civilized standards. . . . The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving stand-
ards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. at 100-01. Warren noted
that "civilized nations" had almost universally rejected denationalization as a penalty. Id. at
102.
161. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962). See note 140 supra.
162. Moreover, since this same "respect for humanity" could probably be said to have
been the basis of some, if not all, of the other original amendments, using this one phrase as a
self-contained test of constitutionality tends to make the specific language of the entire Bill of
Rights meaningless, or at least superfluous.
163. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2972 (1976).
164. Furthermore, even the capital punishment statutes which were approved by the
Court may not provide a sufficiently "principled" application of the death penalty to satisfy
this "fundamental respect for humanity" test. See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 56, 63-76 (1976).
165. Indeed, this was the reference point used by the plurality in deciding thatdeath was
not a cruel and unusual punishment per se. "[T]his assessment [of contemporary values] does
E. The Due Process Alternative
Both in Furman and in the 1976 cases, the Supreme Court could have
avoided the difficulties inherent in its use of eighth amendment reasoning
to evaluate procedures for imposing capital punishment by asking instead
whether these procedures violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 166 It is well recognized that the requirements of due process
vary according to the magnitude of the offense charged and the punishment
authorized.' 67 Since death is so qualitatively different from other punish-
ments applied in the American criminal justice system,t 68 the safeguards
required by due process should be correspondingly greater.' 69 Because of
the absolute finality of death, a capital defendant's interest in having his
sentence determined in a nonarbitrary manner by a judge or jury in
possession of all relevant information should be held to outweigh whatever
state interests might militate against allowing such a procedure. 170 Further,
given the irreversibility of death, a capital defendant's interest in having
the sentencing authority consider mitigating circumstances is so great that
due process should prevent legislatures from precluding such consideration
by making capital punishment mandatory.
The Supreme Court's failure to utilize this approach, and its decision
to apply the eighth amendment to these procedural issues instead, can best
be explained by examining the practical choices the Court faced in 1972
and 1976. Just one year before Furman, in McGautha v. California,171 the
Court had explicitly rejected the contention that due process required
sentencing standards or bifurcated procedures in capital cases. 72 Since
not call for a subjective judgment. It requires, rather, that we look to objective indicia that
reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2925
(1976).
166. -[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I, cl. 2.
167. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 309 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting). For
instance, the right of an indigent defendant to appointed counsel in state proceedings was
recognized in capital cases as early as 1932, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), but was
not extended to noncapital cases until much later. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Similarly, "there is a category of petty crimes or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth
Amendment jury trial provision," Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968), although "a
general grant of jury trial for serious offenses is a fundamental right." Id. at 157-58.
168. Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2992 (1976) (plurality opinion); Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286-91 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
169. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 248 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at
311 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,77 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring); C.
BLACK, supra note 20, at 33.
170. See generally McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 248-312 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
171. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
172. Justice Harlan wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stewart, White, and Blackmun. Justice Black wrote a separate concurring opinion;
Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented. The following passage indicates the
reasoning for the Court's holding:
In light of history, experience, and the present limitations of human knowl-
edge, we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled
discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is
offensive to anything in the Constitution. The States are entitled to assume that
jurors confronted with the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death for a
overruling a one-year-old decision would hardly comport with the Court's
traditional allegiance to stare decisis, the Court in Furman was faced with a
difficult determination. Declaring that death was cruel and unusual punish-
ment per se would have been a drastic, virtually irreversible, and probably
unjustified break from previous cases implicitly or explicitly accepting the
constitutionality of capital punishment. 7 3 Upholding the sentences at
issue, however, would have almost certainly ended the moratorium on
executions; 174 one observer, noting the language of the dissenters in
Furman, remarked that "[i]t is much easier to talk about judicial self-
restraint and deference to legislative judgment when you know you don't
have the votes to send 500 or 600 people to death."1 75 The Court's actual
holding-that the death penalty as then administered was cruel and
unusual-at once avoided (for the time being) the prospect of renewed
executions, left the Court free to deal with subsequently enacted statutes as
future circumstances might dictate, and avoided the necessity of overruling
McGautha. 17 6 The resulting confusion in eighth amendment law may have
been the least of the possible evils, considering the drawbacks of the other
alternatives.
By 1976, however, the Court's options were more limited. A holding
that capital punishment was itself cruel and unusual based on "evolving
standards of decency" would have been difficult to defend, given the
overwhelming public reaffirmation of support for capital punishment
following Furman.177 Nor could the Court effectively maintain the
moratorium while still keeping its options open. Since it confronted such a
variety of statutes, finding them all unsatisfactory under Furman would
have been tantamount to declaring that no constitutional system for
administering the death penalty could be devised. Such de facto abolition
would have been as difficult to defend as a more forthright approach. On
the other hand, the Court was clearly uneasy that its decision in Furman
had led many states to enact mandatory capital punishment statutes, which
one Justice characterized as "regressive and of an antique mold." 178 Thus
fellow human will act with due regard for the consequences of their decision and
will consider a variety of factors, many of which will have been suggested by the
evidence or by the arguments of defense counsel. For a court to attempt to catalog
the appropriate factors in this elusive area could inhibit rather than expand the
scope of consideration, for no list of circumstances would ever be really complete.
The infinite variety of cases and facets to each case would make general standards
either meaningless 'boiler-plate' or a statement of the obvious that no jury would
need.
Id. at 207-08. It should be kept in mind that Justice Harlan, who wrote the McGautha opinion,
was no longer on the Court when Furman and the 1976 cases were decided.
173. See note 34 supra.
174. M. MELTSNER, supra note 1, at 279.
175. Id. at 306.
176. In Furman, Justice Stewart distinguished McGautha on the basis that it involved
due process and equal protection claims rather then eighth amendment arguments. 408 U.S. at
310 n.12. The plurality in Gregg effectively limited McGautha to its facts. 96 S. Ct. at 2936
n.47.
177. See notes 18, 65 and accompanying text supra.
178. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,413(1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Seealso id.
at 402-03 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
the Court chose to overturn the mandatory provisions of North Carolina
and Louisiana while upholding the discretionary systems established by
Georgia, Florida and Texas. While its procedural use of the eighth
amendment to achieve this result is open to question,179 this at least enabled
the Court to avoid directly overruling McGautha. 8°
Even if the Supreme Court's decisions in these cases can be better
explained in terms of the due process clause, however, the constitutionality
of some capital punishment statutes remains in doubt. Because the exact
limits of the plurality's "individualized sentencing determination" re-
quirement are still unclear, the constitutionality of statutes such as that of
Pennsylvania can be determined only through a detailed examination of
their particular provisions.
III. The Pennsylvania Capital Punishment Statute
It took nearly two years after Furman effectively invalidated Pennsyl-
vania's capital punishment provisions 8 ' for the state legislature to pass a
revised capital punishment statute. 82 This new measure, which finally
became law when the General Assembly overrode Governor Milton
Shapp's last-minute veto, 183 both reclassified the degrees of murder in the
Commonwealth and established a modified capital sentencing procedure.
179. This procedural use of the eighth amendment, fortunately, has little value as
precedent. Stare decisis would apply only to the results of these cases rather than to the
reasoning, since no opinion commanded the support of a majority of the Court. See note 33
and accompanying text supra. Only the three members of the plurality accepted the idea that
the eighth amendment could be used in a procedural sense. Similarly, only three Justices took
this position in Furman. See note 16 supra.
180. See note 176 supra.
181. On the same day it decided Furman, the Supreme Court vacated death sentences in
two Pennsylvania cases. Scoleri v. Pennsylvania, 408 U.S. 934 (1972); Phelan v. Brierley, 408
U.S. 939 (1972). At that time there were twenty-six persons awaiting execution in Pennsyl-
vania. Sunday Patriot-News, Dec. 12, 1976, § A at I, col. 3. The state supreme court
recognized that Furman had invalidated the Pennsylvania statute in Commonwealth v.
Bradley, 449 Pa. 19, 295 A.2d 842 (1972). The court also rejected a later attempt to rehabilitate
the statute based on arguments that the death penalty in Pennsylvania was not administered
arbitrarily and that "standards" were in fact used in imposing the penalty. Commonwealth v.
Dobrolenski, 460 Pa. 630, 642-43 & n.5, 334 A.2d 268, 274 & n.5 (1975). These pre-Furman
capital punishment procedures can be found at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4701 (Purdon 1963).
182. On September 27, 1972, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed a
measure mandating the death penalty for first-degree murders accompanied by one of seven
specified aggravating circumstances and providing that executions should be accomplished
by lethal gas. This measure was never approved by the Senate, however. H. R. 884, 156th Gen.
Assem. (1972).
In 1973, the House gave serious consideration to a similar measure, which would have
additionally mandated the death penalty in cases of felony-murder and when "the death of the
victim resulted from the unlawful use of a controlled substance and the defendant adminis-
tered, sold or furnished such substance to the victim or to the person who administered, sold
or furnished such substance to the victim." This latter provision was eliminated on the floor,
but the bill nevertheless remained so controversial that it was recommitted. H.R. 700, 157th
Gen. Assem. (1973). See Pa. Legis. J., Apr. 24, 1973, at 762-95; id., Apr. 25, 1973, at 812-46.
183. The measure which finally became law was introduced in the House on May 30,
1973 and passed on June 12, 1973. This version mandated the death penalty for "intentional
killing" when accompanied by one of seven aggravating circumstances and provided for the
administration of the penalty by lethal gas. H.R. 1060, 157th Gen. Assem. (1973).
On November 12, 1973, the Senate passed a revised version of this measure. The Senate
version dropped the gas-chamber provision, allowed for consideration of four mitigating
circumstances, and established a bifurcated procedure.
A. Provisions of the Statute
1. Reclassification of Murder.-Prior to Furman, Pennsylvania
defined first-degree murder as follows:
A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the first degree
when it is committed by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or
by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing.
A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the first degree if the
actor is engaged in or is an accomplice in the commission of, or
an attempt to commit, or flight after committing, or attempting to
commit robbery, rape, or deviate sexual intercourse by force or
threat of force, arson, burglary, or kidnapping.J84
Section 2502(a) of the 1974 Act, however, simply provides, "A criminal
homicide constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed by an
intentional killing." 8 ' "Intentional killing" is further defined in subsec-
tion (d) as "[k]illing by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any
other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing."' 86 Therefore,
the only substantive difference between the old and new provisions is that
nonintentional killings committed during the course of a felony (felony-
murders), which were formerly included in the definition of first-degree
murder, are now classified instead as second-degree murder, 87 for which
the punishment is life imprisonment.' 88 Finally, "[aIll other kinds of
murder," which formerly were classified as murder of the second de-
gree,"' have been reclassified as murder of the third degree. "Conviction
of a crime conforming to the definition of first-degree murder invokes the
implementation of capital sentencing procedures.
2. Capital Sentencing Procedures.-Pennsylvania's current capi-
tal sentencing procedures are prescribed in title 18, section 1311 of the
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes."'9 Subsection (c) provides that when
a jury returns a first-degree murder conviction,' 92 the trial judge conducts a
sentencing hearing, at which he
After neither house would concur in the other's version, a compromise measure was
devised. While this third and final version of the bill retained most of the changes made by the
Senate, it did eliminate "influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance or defect" as a
mitigating circumstance. It also reorganized the classifications of murder and made several
other technical changes. This compromise version was passed by the House on March 5, 1974
and by the Senate on March 11, 1974.
Governor Shapp vetoed the bill on March 22, 1974, just fifteen minutes before it would
have become law without his signature. N.Y. Times, March 23, 1974, at 36, col. 2; Veto No. 4,
1974 Pa. Laws 1510. Shapp's veto, however, was easily overridden by both houses on March
26.
184. 18 PA. CONS. SrAT. ANN. § 2502(a) (Purdon 1973) (amended 1974).
185. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502(a) (Purdon Supp. 1976-77).
186. Id. § 2502(d).
187. Id. § 2502(b).
188. Id. § 1102(b).
189. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502(b) (Purdon 1973) (amended 1974).
190. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502(c) (Purdon Supp. 1976-77).
191. Purdon Supp. 1976-77, as amended by Judicial Code, Act No. 142, § 4(c), 1976 Pa.
Legis. Serv., No. 4 at 300 (to be codified in 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §131 l(g) (Purdon)).
192. Subsection (a) directs the jury to indicate whether the defendant is guilty of
first-degree, second-degree, or third-degree murder. Subsection (b) directs the trial judge to
instruct the jury concerning these verdicts and to inform the jurors that if they return a
shall proceed to receive such additional evidence not previously
received from the trial as may be relevant and admissible upon
the question of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and
shall permit such argument by counsel, and deliver such charge
thereon as may be just and proper in the circumstances.
The jury then retires to determine the existence of the following aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances, which are listed in subsection (d):
(1) Aggravating circumstances:
(i) The victim was a fireman, peace officer or public serv-
ant concerned in official detention as defined in section 5121 of
this title (relating to escape), who was killed in the performance
of his duties.
(ii) The defendant paid or was paid by another person or
had contracted to pay or be paid by another person or had
conspired to pay or be paid by another person for the killing of
the victim.
(iii) The victim was being held by the defendant for ransom
or reward, or as a shield or hostage.
(iv) The death of the victim occurred while defendant was
engaged in the hijacking of an aircraft.
(v) The victim was a witness to a murder or other felony
committed by the defendant and was killed for the purpose of
preventing his testimony against the defendant in any grand jury
or criminal proceeding involving such offenses.
(vi) The defendant committed a killing while in the perpe-
tration of a felony.
(vii) In the commission of the offense the defendant know-
ingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition
to the victim of the offense.
(viii) The offense was committed by means of torture.
(ix) The defendant has been convicted of another Federal
or State offense, committed either before or at the time of the
offense at issue, for which a sentence of life imprisonment or
death was imposable or the defendant was undergoing a sentence
of life imprisonment for any reason at the time of the commission
of the offense.
(2) Mitigating circumstances:
(i) The age, lack of maturity, or youth of the defendant at
the time of the killing.
(ii) The victim was a participant in or consented to the
defendant's conduct as set forth in section 1311(d) of this title
193
or was a participant in or consented to the killing.
(iii) The defendant was under duress although not such
duress as to constitute a defense to prosecution under section
309194 of this title (relating to duress).
first-degree murder verdict they will then be asked to determine the existence of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances in accordance with subsections (c) and (d). This subsection also
provides for recording the verdict.
193. This reference to "conduct as set forth in section 1311(d) of this title" is unclear. It
may have been intended to refer to the various types of "aggravating" conduct spelled out in
section 131 l(d)(1).
194. Section 309 provides as follows:
According to this subsection, if the jury finds that the offense was
accompanied by one or more aggravating circumstances and no mitigating
circumstances, a sentence of death is imposed; if the jury finds one or more
mitigating circumstances, or fails to find any aggravating circumstances,
the defendant is sentenced to life imprisonment. Subsection (e) states that
when the defendant has pleaded guilty or waived his right to a jury trial1 9 5
"the court shall impose sentence in accordance with Rules of Criminal
Procedure as promulgated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania." 96
Finally, subsection (g) provides for automatic review of all death sentences
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.' 97
Since this procedure resembles the statutes found valid by the Court in
some ways and differs from them in others, its constitutionality cannot
automatically be asserted, but an analysis of this procedure in light of the
standards applied in the 1976 Supreme Court cases suggests the Pennsyl-
vania statute is constitutional.
(a) General rule.-It isa defense that the actorengaged in the conduct charged
to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to
use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, which a person of
reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.
(b) Exception.-The defense provided by subsection (a) of this section is
unavailable if the actor recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was
probable that he would be subjected to duress. The defense is also unavailable if he
was negligent in placing himself in such a situation, whenever negligence suffices to
establish culpability for the offense charged.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 309 (Purdon 1973).
195. Prior to 1973 a defendant in a capital case could not waive his right to a jury trial. The
1973 amendment ended this restriction. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1101.
196. On September 22, 1976, the state supreme court finally adopted rules of procedure
governing the imposition of the death penalty in nonjury cases. These procedures are similar
to those prescribed for use when there is a jury trial, except that a three-judge panel makes the
guilt and sentencing determinations. The decisions that the crime is first-degree murder and
that the crime is accompanied only by aggravating circumstances must be by unanimous vote.
PA. R. CRIM. P. 351-55. See Legal Intelligencer, Oct. 4, 1976, at 1, col. 3.
At the same time, the court suspended Rule 319A, which dealt with sentencing proce-
dures in cases in which a defendant pleaded guilty to murder. Rule 319A(c) directed that "[ilf
the crime is determined to be murder in the first degree, the sentence shall be life imprison-
ment." This provision, when read in conjunction with section 131 l(e) of the Crimes Code,
appeared to indicate that the death sentence could not be imposed in cases in which there was
not a jury trial, and some judges declined to impose the death penalty for that reason. See Pa.
Legis. J., Oct. 15, 1975, at 2930-31 (remarks of Rep. Eckensberger).
If this interpretation were correct, the Pennsylvania statute would have been unconstitu-
tional, since it would have effectively punished defendants who asserted the right to a jury
trial by subjecting them to a possible death sentence. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S.
570 (1968); State v. Funicello, 60 N.J. 60, 286 A.2d 55 (1972).
It is more plausible, however, to infer that the legislature intended both judges and juries
to have the power to impose the death penalty. Section 1102(a) of the Crimes Code provides
unequivocally that "[a] person who has been convicted of a murder of the first degree shall be
sentenced to death or to a term of life imprisonment in accordance with section 131 l(d) of this
title." Furthermore, section 1311(d) states that under the proper circumstances a person
"shall be sentenced to death" without specifying that this directive applies only in cases of
trial by jury. Moreover, it is to be presumed that "the General Assembly does not intend to
violate the Constitution of the United States." I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1922(3) (Purdon
Supp. 1976-77).
This interpretation has been adopted by at least one court. Commonwealth v. Myers, 89
York 26 (Pa. C.P. 1975). See also Brief for Appellee at 16-21, Commonwealth v. Futch, No.
76, March Term 1976 (Pa., filed Jan. 30, 1976).
197. Formerly this section provided for review "within sixty days after certification by
the sentencing court of the entire record." The Judicial Code amended this portion to require
review "within the time prescribed by general rule." Act No. 142, § 4(c), 1976 Pa. Legis.
Serv., No. 4 at 300.
Subsection (f) directs the transmission of the trial record to the Governor in all capital
cases.
B. Analysis of the Statute
1. Similarity to Valid Statutes.-The Pennsylvania statute is simi-
lar to those of Georgia, Florida and Texas in five important respects. First,
the statute provides standards to guide the deliberation of the sentencing
authority. 19 8 Second, at least one statutory aggravating circumstance must
be found before the death penalty may be imposed. 199 Third, the sentenc-
ing authority is allowed to consider mitigating as well as aggravating
factors.200 Fourth, there is provision for a sentencing hearing at which
relevant evidence and arguments may be introduced. 20 1 Fifth, all death
sentences are reviewed by an appellate court with statewide jurisdiction.
20 2
Although these similarities raise a strong presumption that the Pennsyl-
vania statute is constitutional, it nevertheless is in other respects sufficient-
ly dissimilar to those approved by the Court to suggest that it may still be
subject to constitutional attack.
203
2. Dissimilarity to Valid Statutes .- Pennsylvania's statute differs
from those of Georgia, Florida and Texas primarily in that its framework
for the consideration of mitigating circumstances is significantly less
flexible. Under the Pennsylvania procedure, when aggravating circum-
stances are present the death penalty is automatic unless the jury also finds
that one or more mitigating circumstances exist. 2° 4 Under the statutes
upheld by the Supreme Court, however, the sentencer can decline to
impose the death penalty, even if aggravating factors exist, without making
specific reference to any mitigating circumstance. 20 5 Moreover, in
Pennsylvania the finding of any mitigating circumstance automatically
precludes the possibility of a death sentence,2°6 while in Georgia, Florida
and Texas sentencing authorities may impose the death penalty in cases
involving both aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 207 Finally, the
Pennsylvania procedure limits consideration of mitigating circumstances
198. See notes 78-96 and accompanying text ,upra.
199. Section 1311(d) provides as follows:
If a murder of the first degree is accompanied by at least one of the following
aggravating circumstances and none of the following mitigating circumstances, the
person convicted shall be sentenced to death. If a murder of the first degree is not
accompanied by any of the following aggravating circumstances or is accompanied
by at least one of the following mitigating circumstances the person convicted shall
be sentenced to life imprisonment.
See notes 97-102 and accompanying text s upra.
Moreover, the specific aggravating circumstances listed in the Pennsylvania statute are
very similar to those prescribed by Florida, Texas, Georgia, and even Louisiana: Compare §
1311(c) with statutes quoted in notes 81, 96, 92, and 123 supra.
200. See notes 103-09 and accompanying text supra.
201. See notes 110-14 and accompanying text supra.
202. See notes 115-20 and accompanying text supra.
203. It may or may not be significant that the phrase "mandating the death sentence for
certain first degree murder" is used in the title of the Pennsylvania Act. Death Penalty Act,
Act No. 46, 1974 Pa. Laws 213 (emphasis added).
204. See note 199 supra.
205. See notes 81-96 and accompanying text supra.
206. See note 199 supra.
207. See notes 81-96 and accompanying text supra.
to those specifically enumerated in the statute; 20 8 there are no similar
restrictions in the procedures of the other three states.
20 9
This inflexibility means that the Pennsylvania system may have a
significant jury nullification problem. 210 A jury might well rebel at
imposing the death penalty if the defendant had no prior criminal record,
committed the crime under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance, or suffered from impaired capacity to conform his conduct to
the law, for example. 211 Yet none of these factors qualifies as a mitigating
circumstance under the Pennsylvania Act, although any or all of them
could be considered under the statutes of Georgia, Florida or Texas. If the
jury's distaste for imposing the death penalty under these circumstances
outweighs its inclination to abide by its instructions, however, it may
nullify by declining to find a clearly indicated aggravating circumstance or
by pretending to find a nonexistent mitigating circumstance.
Thus jury nullification under the Pennsylvania statute is clearly
possible-the important question is whether such nullification is likely to
occur so often that the administration of the death penalty will be uncon-
stitutionally arbitrary as a result. Unless and until someone presents
evidence demonstrating the frequency of such nullification, the Supreme
Court should not invalidate the statute because of the mere possibility that
such a result will occur. Nullification takes place only when juries disagree
with their instructions strongly enough to violate them. History has
demonstrated that juries frequently disagree with and nullify instructions
prescribing the death penalty in every case of first-degree murder; 2 12 the
Court's invalidation of North Carolina's capital punishment statute was
based in part on this historical record. 213 History is silent, however,
concerning how frequently juries will disagree with more explicit instruc-
tions such as those now provided by Pennsylvania. Since the Court has
traditionally presumed the validity of legislatively enacted punishments 214
it should not overturn the Pennsylvania statute on the basis of its alleged
susceptibility to jury nullification unless it actually can be shown that
nullification occurs often enough to result in an unconstitutionally arbitrary
system of capital punishment.
The inflexibility of Pennsylvania's procedure for considering mitigat-
ing circumstances also raises the possibility that Pennsylvania's sentencing
208. See note 199 supra.
209. Texas and Georgia provide generally for the consideration of mitigating circum-
stances without specifically listing any. See notes 89, 93, 104 and 106-08 and accompanying
text supra. Florida lists seven mitigating circumstances but apparently does not prohibit the
sentencing authority from considering others. See Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960, 2965 n.8
(1976) (plurality opinion). Compare note 82 with note 81 supra.
210. See notes 147-56 and accompanying text supra.
211. Each of these mitigating circumstances is specifically listed in the Florida statute.
See note 82 supra.
212. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
213. Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2990-91 (1976). See notes 147-56 and
accompanying text supra.
214. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2925-26 (1976) (plurality opinion). The dissenters
in Furman also emphasized this theme of judicial restraint. See note 16 supra.
procedure may not be sufficiently individualized. The 1976 cases did not
explicitly define the limits of the individualized sentencing requirement; it
can be said with assurance only that the statutes of Georgia, Florida and
Texas (which place no limits on the consideration of mitigating circum-
stances) satisfy the requirement, while those of North Carolina and
Louisiana (which allow no consideration whatsoever of such circum-
stances) do not. 2 15 Pennsylvania, on the other hand, provides for consider-
ation of mitigating circumstances, but only to a limited extent. Since the
sentencing authority can only consider those mitigating circumstances
specified in the statute, the "circumstances of the particular offense"
216
can be taken into account only if they involve participation or consent by
the victim, or duress. 217 Moreover, the only factors relating to the
"character and record of the individual offender" 21 8 that can be considered
are "age, lack of maturity, [and] youth." 2 19 Thus it would seem that a
mature, middle-aged defendant would not be able to bring his past record
before a Pennsylvania jury at all. 2 20 Indeed, if his offense did not involve
either consent or participation by the victim or duress and was accom-
panied by some aggravating factor, the death sentence would be imposed
automatically.
Nevertheless, the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute should
be affirmed. The Supreme Court has recognized that states should be given
latitude in selecting aggravating and mitigating circumstances: "[T]he jury
[should be] given guidance regarding the factors about the crime and the
defendant that the State, representing organized society, deems particu-
larly relevant to the sentencing decision."221 If a state decides that a
particular factor should not be regarded as a mitigating circumstance, it is
hard to see any constitutional justification for denying it that right. By
doing so, the Court would actually be telling that state what factors it must
deem relevant to sentencing. Moreover, the discretion of the sentencing
authority would appear to be more effectively guided when some limits are
placed on its consideration of mitigating circumstances. Finally, upholding
the statute is dictated by practical considerations. While it is easy to
distinguish between statutes that allow some consideration of mitigating
circumstances and those that do not, it would be much more difficult for the
Court to distinguish two statutes providing for such consideration on the
grounds that one allowed "sufficient" consideration and the other did not.
C. Recommendations
Although Pennsylvania's capital punishment statute as presently
worded should be upheld as constitutional, it is to be hoped that such a
215. See notes 147-65 and accompanying text supra.
216. Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991 (1976) (plurality opinion).
217. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1311(d)(2)(ii)-(iii) (Purdon Supp.,1976-77).
218. Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991 (1976) (plurality opinion).
219. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1311(d)(2)(i) (Purdon Supp. 1976-77).
220. This assumes that the word "age" is intended to refer to old age. See note 223 infra.
221. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2934 (1976) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
holding would not have the unfortunate side effect of freezing the statute in
its present form.2 22 At the very least, certain clarifying amendments are in
order. 223 Moreover, the fact that death sentences during the first eighteen
months of the new statute were imposed more frequently than in the final
few years of the pre-Furman provisions 224 suggests that the rigidity of the
new procedure may be producing more capital sentences than are necessary
or desirable. Accordingly, since the 1976 decisions demonstrate that such
rigidity is unnecessary, the General Assembly should consider providing
additional mitigating circumstances and adopting a "balancing" proce-
dure similar to that of Florida. 225 It should also reevaluate each of the
aggravating circumstances to ensure that the penalty of death serves a
significant social purpose as applied to each category. Finally, it should not
be reluctant to abandon capital punishment altogether if at some future time
it appears that it is no longer acceptable or necessary.
IV. Conclusion
In Gregg, Proffitt, Jurek, Woodson, and Roberts, the 1976 Supreme
Court both clarified and expanded Furman. It clarified Furman by holding
that the death penalty is not necessarily a cruel and unusual punishment for
murder, 226 by declining to extend the rationale of Furman to include
discretion outside the sentencing process, and by affirming the constitu-
tionality of the three "guided discretion" statutes at issue. It also expanded
Furman by requiring that capital sentencing procedures allow indi-
vidualized consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, a
requirement that mandatory statutes, by definition, cannot meet. Perhaps
the day will come when this ultimate sanction is no longer necessary in or
tolerated by our society. Until then, these decisions at least ensure that the
penalty will be imposed in a rational manner and the individual circum-
stances of each defendant will be considered.
MICHAEL D. RHOADS
222. The General Assembly never did clarify whether a trial judge could impose a death
sentence in a nonjury trial, even though its failure to do so could have resulted in the
invalidation of the entire statute. See note 196 supra.
223. Representative Eckensberger introduced a set of clarifying amendments in 1975.
H.R. 1840, 159th Gen. Assem. The provisions of this bill included making multiple murder an
aggravating circumstance and clarifying the first mitigating circumstance by replacing "age"
by "old age." it also resolved the problem of capital sentencing in nonjury trials by providing
for a separate sentencing jury in such cases. See Pa. Legis. J., Oct. 15, 1975, at 2929-31
(remarks of Rep. Eckensberger).
224. Seven death sentences were imposed in the first eighteen months of operation of the
new statute, an average of about five per year. From 1960-1972, a total of thirty-five death
sentences were imposed, an average of about three per year. Id. at 2930.
225. See notes 82, 84 and accompanying text supra.
226. The Court specifically declined to decide whether or not death was a cruel and
unusual punishment for crimes other than murder. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909,2932 n.35
(1976) (plurality opinion). In a later case, however, the Court agreed to determine the
constitutionality of a Georgia statute providing for the death penalty in certain cases of rape.
Coker v. State, 234 Ga. 555, 216 S.E.2d 782 (1975), cert. granted sub nom., Coker v. Georgia,
97 S. Ct. 56 (1976) (No. 75-5444).

